SNIC
SUPR
SNIC SUPR
Eliminating memory side-channel attacks
Dnr:

SNIC 2018/8-115

Type:

SNAC Small

Principal Investigator:

Magnus Själander

Affiliation:

Uppsala universitet

Start Date:

2018-03-16

End Date:

2019-04-01

Primary Classification:

10206: Computer Engineering

Webpage:

Allocation

Abstract

he project is trying to develop a solution for cache and memory-based timing side-channel attacks (e.g., Meltdown). Instead of focusing on a specific issue, we are developing a solution that preemptively prevents all similar attacks by not allowing visible memory hierarchy side-effects during speculative execution. The solution needs not only to be secure, but it also needs to introduce only minimal performance overhead, since speculation is very common during normal execution.